Mattress Legal Term

Reports requested from recyclers and renovators must include, but are not limited to, quantitative information on the number of mattresses received and recycled or refurbished during the previous calendar year, as well as any other information deemed necessary by CalCycle. These reports must also be submitted to the mattress recycler. Annual reports must be submitted by May 1, 2017 and annually thereafter. In the present case, it is common ground that it concerns home telephone services for retail mattresses. Dial-A-Mattress also does not dispute the Director`s following legal evidence and findings: (1) The designation of area code (888) in the proposed mark alone has no meaning to the source; 2. `mattress` means the legal `equivalent` of the word `mattress`; and (3) the word “mattress” alone is generic for retail services in the mattress sector. Simply put, a mattress recycling organization founded by a qualified industry organization designs and manages its own stewardship program, including program funding. It prepares and implements a recovery and recycling plan for used mattresses to achieve specific goals and reports annually to CalRecycle on its progress. CalRecycle approves annual plans and budgets, sets goals, reviews progress, and provides oversight and enforcement to ensure a level playing field for program participants. The determination of the generic character of a mark is based on a two-part analysis: “First, what is the class of the goods or services in question? Second, the term must be registered.

Does the relevant audience primarily mean this category of goods or services? H. Marvin Ginn Corp., 782 F.2d to 990, 228 USPQ to 530. The placement of a term on the imaginative-suggestive-descriptive-generic continuum is a matter of fact. With respect to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d to 1569-70, 4 USPQ2d to 1142-43. The Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office bears the burden of proof for a generic name. With regard to Am. Fertility Soc`y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1345, 51 USPQ2d 1832, 1834 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Any knowledgeable source is sufficient to demonstrate an understanding of a disputed term by the relevant buyer groups, including buyer statements, consumer surveys, dictionary definitions, trade journals, newspapers and other publications. With respect to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d to 1570, 4 USPQ2d to 1143; In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 160, 229 USPQ 818, 819 (Fed. Cir.

1986). If a term is a “compound word” (p. e.g., “screen scan”), the Director may discharge his burden of proving that it is generic by proving that each of the constituent words is generic and that “the individual words associated to form a compound have a meaning identical to that which common usage would attribute to these words as a compound.” With respect to Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1018, 5 USPQ2d 1110, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, if the proposed mark is wording (e.g., “Society for Reproductive Medicine”), the board “cannot simply cite definitions and generic uses of trademark elements”; He must conduct an investigation into “the meaning of the sentence challenged as a whole”. In re The Am. Fertility Soc`y, 188 F.3d to 1347, 51 USPQ2d to 1836. The In re Gould test applies only to “compound terms formed by the combination of words” if the public understands the individual terms as generic for a category of goods or services and if the combination of the individual terms into a compound word “does not give any additional meaning to the term”. Id. at 1348-49, 51 USPQ2d at 1837. The Director submits that the Board`s test is consistent with In re Gould`s argument that the proposed mark resembles a compound word rather than a sentence.

He submits that, since it is not disputed that both (888) and `MATRESS` are generic, the combination of the two creates a term which has no meaning other than the individual meanings of each of its components. However, the Director provides no justification for this conclusion. Instead, he relies on the argument of Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 859-60, 23 USPQ2d 1174, 1180 (3rd Cir. 1992), that trademark protection should not be granted to telephone numbers consisting of a generic mnemonic word because it would prevent competitors from using this tool and “obtain the kind of unfair competitive advantage that the generic doctrine is supposed to prevent”. Dial-A-Mattress submits that its previously registered trademarks, in particular “(212) M-A-T-T-R-E-S” (registered for “retail services and retail services with mattresses”) and the trademark “1-800-MATTRES, AND LEAVE OFF THE LAST S THAT`S FOR SAVINGS” (registered for “Retail Outlet Services and Retail Direct Sales of Mattresses” rejected by “1-800”) are the legal equivalents of “1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S”. The proposed mark differs from the former only in the indication of the exact area code and a slight spelling error, and from the latter only in the addition of a superfluous sentence. The council found that the dominant theme of Dial-A-Mattress`s previous brands and advertising was “the omission of the last S, which is the S for savings.” Since “1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S” does not omit the last `S`, the board concluded that it does not give the same commercial impression as Dial-A-Mattress`s previously registered trademarks.